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 Abstract 
 
Transportation costs constitute up to thirty percent of the total costs involved in a supply 
chain. Outsourcing the transportation service requirements to third party logistics 
providers have been widely adopted, as they are economically more rational than owning 
and operating a service. Transportation service procurement has been traditionally done 
through an auctioning process where the auctioneer (shipper) auctions lanes (distinct 
delivery routes) to bidders (carriers). Individual lanes were being auctioned separately 
disallowing the carriers to express complements and substitutes. Using combinatorial 
auctions mechanism to auction all available lanes together would allow the carriers to 
take advantage of the lane bundles, their existing service schedule, probability of securing 
other lanes and available capacity to offer services at lower rates and be more 
competitive. The winners of the auction are the set of non-overlapping bids that minimize 
the cost for the shippers. The winner determination problem to be solved in determining 
the optimal allocation of the services in such kind of combinatorial auctions is a NP-hard 
problem. Many heuristics like approximate linear programming, stochastic local search 
have proposed to find an approximate solution to the problem in a reasonable amount of 
time. Akcoglu et al [22] developed the opportunity cost algorithm using the “local ratio 
technique” to compute a greedy solution to the problem. A recalculation modification to 
the opportunity cost algorithm has been formulated where opportunity costs are 
recalculated every time for the set of remaining bids after eliminating the bid chosen to 
be a part of the winning solution and its conflicts have eliminated. Another method that 
formulates the winning solution based on the maximum total revenue values calculated 
for each bid using the opportunity cost algorithm has also been researched.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
As businesses strive to reduce costs to remain on top of the competition, one of the major 
areas that has attracted a lot of attention is supply chain systems and especially 
transportation.  Techniques such as combinatorial auctions have recently been used to 
increase the efficiency of the transportation procurement process. This research 
introduces some modifications to the opportunity cost algorithm formulated by Akcoglu 
et al [22] to improve the solutions for the winner determination problem in combinatorial 
auctions. A maximum total revenue (MTR) method that uses the opportunity cost 
algorithm has also been formulated to produce better quality solutions. 
1.1 Supply Chain 
 
A supply chain is a network that is comprised of the production and distribution facilities 
that procure raw materials and transform these materials into intermediate and finished 
goods and distribute the finished goods to customers [1]. The example supply chain 
depicted in Figure 1 consists of suppliers, a manufacturer, distributors and customers. 
The supplier supplies raw materials required for the production process to the 
manufacturer. The manufacturer processes the raw material and has the finished goods 
ready for the distributors to ship them to the customers when and where they want it. 
The term supply chain may also be applied to a large company with several sites 
often located in different countries. Coordinating materials and information flows for 
such a company in an efficient manner is a formidable task. However, the resultant 
network will be a simple supply chain, similar to the network shown in Figure 1. Supply 
chain may include many different organizations working together to meet the customer 
demand by coordinating material, information and financial flow between themselves. 
 2
Coordinating the activities of the different organizations involved in the supply chain is a 
complex process and is critical to the successful operation of the supply chain. 
Supply chain networks get more complicated as the number of participants in the 
network grows and the flow of materials and information between them become more 
interwoven. Suppliers by themselves can form a large network and the transfer of the raw 
materials from the suppliers to the manufacturer is a logistical problem of its own. The 
manufacturing process in the supply chain network need not be a single step as shown in 
Figure 1. The manufacturer can process the raw material in stages to produce an 
intermediate product. The intermediate products require transportation from one 
manufacturer to another. The production process can thus consist of a network of various 
manufacturers. Once the product has been processed to completion, the product gets 
shipped to the various distributors in the supply chain. The distributor then ships the final 
product to the final destination, the customers. The distribution process may involve 
various distributors contributing to complete the delivery of the products to the 
customers. All distributors may not be able to carry out delivery to all the customers in 
their various geographically dispersed locations. So, they have to utilize the distribution 
network of their distribution partners who may be able to reach those customer locations 
to complete delivery. Distribution centers are used to make the transfer of goods possible 
between distributors. The distributors own warehouses and distribution centers in various 
locations to aid the process. Thus supply chain in the real world may be considerably 
more complex than the supply chain network shown in the Figure 1. A real world supply 
chain might look more like the network shown in Figure 2. 
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Supplier 3
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Figure 1: A Simple Supply Chain Model 
 
Suuppliers Manufacturers
Distributors
Customers
 
Figure 2: A More Complex Supply Chain 
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1.2 Supply Chain Management 
 
Supply chain management’s objective is to integrate and manage the sourcing, flow and 
control of materials and information between the various participants in the supply chain 
network in order to strike a balance between the conflicting goals of high customer 
service, low inventory management and low unit cost. 
Supply chain management takes a systems approach to view the whole supply 
chain network as a single entity, rather than as individual organizations, integrating the 
various participants to manage the total flow of goods from the supplier to the customer 
[1]. All participants in the supply chain network directly and indirectly affect the 
performance of all other members in the network, thus affecting the overall performance 
of the total network. It seeks to synchronize the various intra-firm and inter-firm 
operations to reduce the total cost involved and deliver the products to the customers in a 
timely manner. By working together, all the participants in the supply chain enhance 
revenue by reducing inventories, lowering operating costs, increasing product 
availability, increasing resource utilization as well as by raising the standards of customer 
satisfaction. The efficiency and the response time of the entire supply chain is one of the 
keys to its success because getting the products to the customer at the right time is an 
integral part of customer satisfaction. 
The six key elements to a supply chain are production, supply, inventory, 
location, transportation and information [1]. Decisions involving each of these factors 
have a ripple effect and travel through the entire supply chain to eventually dictate the 
efficiency of the supply chain.  
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1.3 Transportation in Supply Chain 
 
Transportation of goods is a major part of the supply chain and contributes to a 
significant portion of the costs of operation of the supply chain. Every movement of 
goods involves decisions on the kind of transport mode to be used and who carries out the 
transportation of the goods. The transportation can be done either by the supplier of the 
goods or the receiver of the goods, or the transportation can be outsourced to third party 
logistic providers. Transportation also takes place within each site, but these movements 
are classified under material handling issues and are handled by the production planning 
process. The transportation phase of the supply chain is concerned only with the 
transportation between suppliers, manufacturers, and customers and intermediaries such 
as warehouses or distributors. Physical distribution is not only a significant cost for most 
businesses, it also has a direct and significant impact on its competitiveness through 
speed, reliability and its availability. As customers expect faster and quicker delivery, the 
transportation in the supply chain has to adapt to meet those demands while trying to 
reduce the overall cost of operation of the supply chain. 
Operating a transportation service that is capable of handling such flexible and 
changing requirements is expensive for most businesses to handle. For them, contracting 
their transportation requirements to third party logistics providers makes the most 
economic sense and helps them concentrate on their core business areas. Third party 
logistics providers offer a highly competitive physical distribution system, which can 
handle shipments of varying sizes with tight delivery deadlines. Reasons to outsource the 
transportation requirements extend beyond economic benefits. It eliminates the need for a 
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huge initial capital investment. Other reasons to outsource transportation may include the 
following. 
• Control. Owning a transport service that is not being utilized to its fullest 
efficiency is a liability and an overhead on company resources. Logistics 
companies offer good control without the burden of inflexibility of your own 
vehicles. 
• Service. Outsourcing transportation requirements allows businesses to concentrate 
more on their core competency areas and make their products better. 
• Flexibility. Owning and operating a transport service requires a constant demand. 
Varying demands on the system may lead to inefficiencies and decrease in quality 
of service. Third-party logistics providers are well equipped to handle varying 
demands and can execute orders of any size within any time period. 
• Management. Managing a self owned transportation service become complex as 
the demands on the system increases. It not only requires maintenance of the 
system but also the recruitment and training of personnel to operate it. 
Transportation backed by an inefficient management renders the transportation 
operation uncompetitive against specialized and better-managed logistic 
providers. The results of such a transport system are reflected in the unit price the 
customer pays for the service. 
1.4 Auctions 
 
An auction is an excellent mechanism to determine the value of goods that do not have a 
determined market value and to distribute them to those who value them most highly. An 
auction offers the advantage of simplicity in determining market-based prices. It is simple 
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and efficient and ensures that sellers receive the best available value for their goods or 
services. The price of goods are set by the bidders and not the seller, thus as the demand 
for the goods increase so does the price the offered by the bidders increasing the revenue 
of the sellers. 
There are different ways to classify auctions. There are open auctions as well as 
sealed-bid auctions. There are one-sided auctions where only bids are permitted, but not 
"asks", where a seller puts up a price for the goods to be matched by the bidders. In a 
double auction bids and asks take place at the same time. There are auctions where the 
price ascends and auctions where the price drops at regular intervals. Vickrey established 
the basic taxonomy of auctions [2] based upon the order in which prices are quoted and 
the manner in which bids are tendered. He established four major auction types: English, 
Dutch, First-Price sealed-bid, and Vickrey (uniform second-price).  
1.4.1 English Auctions 
 
The English auction, also known as the open-outcry auction or the ascending price 
auction is the most commonly used. Milgrom [3] defines the English auction in the 
following manner. "Here the auctioneer begins with the lowest acceptable price--the 
reserve price-- and proceeds to solicit successively higher bids from the customers until 
no one will increase the bid. The item is 'knocked down' (sold) to the highest bidder.” If 
the reserve price is not met for some goods, the auctioneer can opt to hold on to the item. 
The items can be auctioned after some time when the auctioneer feels that it might bring 
him the reserve price or an even better price. In some cases, the auctioneer can opt to start 
the auctions without setting a reserve price, mainly in order to thwart colluding bidders. 
The manner in which the auctions are held varies widely.  
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Competition is at its highest in the English auctions. Winner's curse (paying more 
for an item than its value) is a discouraging factor in this type of auction because 
inexperienced participants bid up the price. 
1.4.2 Dutch Auctions 
 
Dutch auctions are also commonly known as decreasing price auctions or the uniform 
second-price auction. The Dutch auctions use the open bid format rather than the sealed 
bid format. In these auctions the starting price is set to an extremely high price. The 
auctioneer calls out the set starting price and looks out for any bidders ready to take up on 
the offer. If no bidders are ready to take the goods at that price then the auctioneer 
progressively lowers the price till he can find bidders willing to take up the items at that 
price. In the case where multiple items are being auctioned, more bidders put out bids as 
the price keeps lowering. As a result of which the winners of the initial auctions pay a 
heavier price than the bidders that take the latter units in the auction. And the price at 
which the items are bought gets lower as the auction progresses for the multiple items. 
The basic concept behind the Dutch auctions is that the longer the item remains unsold 
the lower the price fetched by the item.  
1.4.3 First-Price, Sealed Bid Auctions 
 
The primary characteristics of these auctions are that the bids are sealed and the 
participating bidders are unaware of the prices bid by the other bidders unlike the open 
bidding methods of the English and the Dutch auctions. In these auctions, the bidders 
submit their prices in complete ignorance of their competitor’s prices. Generally, the 
sealed bid auctions have two phases. During the first phase, the auctioneer accepts sealed 
bids from the various bidders till a preset time deadline is reached. The second phase 
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involves resolution of the submitted bids, that is, the auctioneer opens up the received 
bids and determines the winner of the auction. Again there exists a distinction between 
single and multiple bid auctions. The name ‘First-price’ comes from the fact that the 
goods are awarded to the bidder with the highest price. In the case of multiple item 
auctions, it is called ‘discriminatory’ because not all the winners pay the same price. In 
the multiple unit auctions, all the received bids are sorted in a descending order of their 
price and items are allocated in order from the highest bidder until the items are 
exhausted. The downside in this regard is that the winners end up paying different prices 
for the same item.  
1.4.4 Vickery Auctions 
 
Vickery auctions are otherwise called uniform second-price auctions. Vickery auctions 
are also sealed bid auctions and the bidders are ignorant of their competitors’ prices. But 
the distinguishing factor is that the winners of the Vickery auctions do not pay the 
amount they bid but instead the amount of the highest losing bid. On first sight, the 
Vickery auctions seem to be very seller unfriendly because of the fact that the seller 
settles for price that is less than the highest offered price. But deeper analysis shows that 
it is not the truth. In the discriminatory First-price sealed bid auctions, the bidders fear the 
fact that they might end up paying more for the same goods than somebody else. So the 
bidders tend to adjust their bids downwards. This kind of thinking across the bidders 
eventually brings down the price. On the other hand, the Vickery auctions encourage the 
bidders to upsize their bids. Because higher bids do not mean that the bidder is paying an 
uncompetitive price but the bidder just pays the price of the highest losing bid that is 
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closer to the market value. Thus the price that the winner pays is not entirely depended on 
his actions but solely on the bid prices of the competitors.  
1.4.5 Double Auctions 
 
In double auctions, both the seller and the buyer submit bids, that is, the auction is not 
one sided and is more interactive. These are used to create a demand profile. The bids are 
arranged in order from highest to lowest. From the profiles that have been generated, the 
maximum quantity exchanged can be determined by matching selling offers (starting 
with lowest price and moving up) with demand bids (starting with highest price and 
moving down). This format allows buyers to make offers and sellers to accept those 
offers at any particular moment. A "continuous double auction" is one in which many 
individual transactions are carried on at a single moment and trading does not stop as 
each auction is concluded.  
1.5 Combinatorial Auctions 
 
In the previous auction formats items are auctioned separately either sequentially or in 
parallel. The bidders are forced to bid on each item separately and speculate on the value 
of each item individually. But the actual value of the item depends on what other items 
the bidder receives in the auction. The bidders associate a price with a specific collection 
of goods; associating a value with the individual items can be problematic. This requires 
the bidder to look ahead and base the price decisions of its bids on its expectations to win 
other items in future auctions. Even after forecasting and predicting the expected course 
of the auctions, there remains an uncertainty factor due to the absence of complete 
information about the other bidders participating in the auction. This leads to inefficient 
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allocations of items where the bidders do not win their required combination of products 
and as a result the bidders may value it at a price less than what they had paid for it. 
The inefficiencies in the allocations resulting from the sequential and parallel 
auction mechanisms can be overcome by various techniques. The bidders can be allowed 
to retract their bids when they do not get the combinations they needed. These items can 
then be auctioned again or the item can be allocated to the bidder who ended up second. 
But if the winning price of the second auction was less than the price of the first then the 
difference in the amount has to be paid by the retractor as a penalty. Another approach 
that has been practiced is to sell the option for retracting upfront. Also an aftermarket can 
be setup where the bidders exchange items among them after the auction has ended. This 
approach can undo some of the inefficiencies in the allocation. But to reach an optimal 
allocation among the bidders there might have to be impossibly large number of 
exchanges between the bidders [4]. 
 Combinatorial auctions can be used to overcome deficiencies of the single item 
sequential or parallel auctions. In combinatorial auctions, instead of selling items 
individually, the seller allows bidders to bid on collections or bundles of items. The 
bidder is allowed to express complements and substitutes between items being auctioned. 
This allows the bidders to express their requirements completely without room for 
speculation and avoid the risk of obtaining incomplete bundles. The bidders do not have 
to interpolate the outcome of other auctions with complementary and substitutable items 
when valuing prices of items or bundles of items. 
Combinatorial auctions have been successfully used in various fields to replace 
sequential parallel auctions to improve revenues or reduce costs. Volvo conducted a 
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combinatorial auction in February 2001 for the procurement of wooden packaging 
material [25]. Volvo auctioned the contracts for 600 commodities aggregated in 14 
segments. The result of the combinatorial auction helped Volvo to reduce its total cost 
from $180 million to $172.9 million Swedish Kronors. The saving of $7.1 million is a 
substantial amount considering that Volvo just had to change its auctioning mechanism. 
The auction results also reduced the number of winning suppliers from 15 to 6, which on 
its own resulted in cost savings in terms of reduced administrative and overhead costs. 
The efficiency and the benefits resulting from combinatorial auctions attracted Federal 
Communications Commission to switch its auction mechanism to combinatorial auctions 
in June 2002 [26]. Other proposals to use combinatorial auctions for resource allocation 
of airport takeoff and landing time slots [15] and for the telecommunications industry 
[16] have been suggested. 
The combinatorial auction mechanism works based on the assumption that the 
participating bidders are able to express their requirement exactly with out any 
compromise and can submit any number of bids as required. In case of auctions with 
small number of items, bids containing complementary and supplementary items can be 
expressed with the bidders submitting bids with the list of items they require and an 
attached value. The auctioneer has to allocate items to bidders so that the items in the 
allocated bids do not conflict. But as the number of items being auctioned increases and 
the requirements of the bidders become more complex, the number of bids that the bidder 
has to submit in order to completely and exactly express his requirements becomes larger 
in size. Allowing the bidders to submit their requirements in the form of a computer 
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algorithm or program that completely express the requirement can solve this problem of 
exponential number of bids. 
1.6 Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement 
 
As discussed in Section 1.2, transportation of goods is a major factor in supply chain 
management. The transportation of the goods in many networks contributes up to thirty 
percent of the total supply chain costs. In many cases, it is more economical for the 
shippers to outsource their transportation to various third party logistic providers than to 
operate a transportation service of their own. In the past, when the shippers needed to 
obtain transportation services for a set of distinctive delivery routes (called lanes) with 
different origins and destinations or delivery schedules, they would send out a request for 
quotes to all of their carrier partners. When the shippers need to transport goods or 
materials, they send out a request for quotes to all of their carrier partners. The carriers 
study the request and come up with a price that they would require to satisfy the request. 
The carriers submit their bid amount to the shippers who, after receiving replies from all 
the carriers, evaluates the best quotes in order to reduce its own transportation costs. This 
process adopted by the shippers is a simple sealed-bid auction process to determine the 
carriers and in turn optimize the shippers’ costs. This system may be able to achieve 
economies of scale for carriers. However, it ignores the economies of complements and 
substitutes that are inherent in transportation operations. In some cases, the shippers 
would negotiate a price for bundles of lanes with each carrier one at a time.  
Carriers tend to have different valuations for different combinations of lanes 
depending on whether the lanes in the bundle are complementary or substitutable. The 
cost of operating lanes exhibits interdependencies. Valuations for bundles may differ by a 
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substantial amount between carriers depending on their available capacity, previously 
scheduled deliveries and the possibility of obtaining another complementary lane from 
other shippers. The carriers can use their existing capacity in half-truck and empty 
movements to fit the shipper’s needs and be able to offer the service at a considerably 
lower price than other carriers. Caplice studied these interdependencies [11] and observed 
that the traditional procurement process does not properly make use of this property. 
With the help of new software and information technology systems, it has become 
possible for the shippers to make all lanes available for bidding to all the carriers at the 
same time. This enables the carriers to bid on any combinations of available lanes that fit 
well with its existing capacity and schedule thus fully utilizing the complements and 
substitutes existing between all the lanes available for bidding. This process of 
introducing many lanes for auctioning simultaneously can be carried out efficiently using 
combinatorial auction mechanisms. Shippers can use combinatorial auction mechanisms 
to auction the lanes and make significant cost savings [12] using the synergies of sets of 
lanes. Ledyard et al [12] recorded the procurement of trucking services by Sears Logistics 
Services involving 854 different lanes with a service cost of approximately $190 million 
per year. Sears Logistics Services switched from the traditional trucking service 
acquisition process to using a multi-round combinatorial reverse auction in which 
participating carriers were pre-selected to guarantee service levels. In each round a 
tentative winning price is announced and the auction continues until the terminating rule 
is satisfied. Using this variation of the combinatorial process, Sears Logistics Services 
reported a 13% savings, which reduced its transportation procurement cost by $25 
million per year. 
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Chapter 2. Problem Statement 
 
In this research, we study the single-unit transportation service procurement problem 
using the traditional request-for-quote-and-negotiation process and the effects of 
conducting the process using combinatorial auction mechanisms. In this problem, the 
shipper requires transport for a set of lanes. Each of the lanes in the requirement has only 
a single unit demand; in other words, all of the lanes in the set are unique. If the shipper 
has a demand of multiple units for the same lane, then the shipper has to represent the 
multiple requirements as separate single unit requirement and uniquely identify them. 
The shipper receives bids from all the interested bidders and has a set of bids with 
conflicting lanes possibly multiple bids from individual carriers. The shipper has to 
examine all the bids received and pick a winning combination of bids. The winning 
combination must minimize the total cost incurred by the shipper while satisfying the 
demand for all the lanes. In any outcome of the combinatorial auction, the winning 
combination must be disjoint set of lanes that is no single lane can be present in more 
than one winning combination of bids or in other words no single should be allocated to 
more than one carrier. 
Winner determination in sequential and parallel auction mechanisms is as easy as 
picking the bid with the largest quoted price for each item separately. Picking the winner 
of such auctions is linear in time. The computing time is linear with the number of bids 
received for all of the items on auction. That is, if m is the number of items that are being 
auctioned and n the number of bidders bidding on those items, then the time for 
computation is equal to m*n. 
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Unfortunately in combinatorial auctions, the winner determination is not as 
simple as in the case of sequential and parallel auctions. The bidders are allowed to 
submit any number of bids, on any combinations of bundles and the items in the bundles 
can overlap. That is, we have a set of all the items up for bid M and a collection of bids B 
that are subsets of M with non-negative weights. Finding the smallest total weight 
independent set is equivalent to a Set Packing Problem (SPP) problem. Obtaining the 
optimal solution in such cases would involve checking all possible combinations that are 
possible with the collections of bids B that are submitted. The number of solutions that 
need to be checked in that would be equal to 2|B|, which would be impossible to solve 
optimally for increasingly large number of bids. Although the optimal solution for cases 
with small number of bids may be obtainable in a reasonable amount of time as the 
number of bids increases, the time required for computation explodes. The winner 
determination problem belongs to a class of problems called NP-hard. No polynomial 
time algorithms have yet been suggested for problems that belong to the NP-hard class. 
Such problems are solved by either relaxing some of the requirements of the problem 
definition or by deploying heuristics that find a winning solution that is close to the 
optimal solution in a reasonable amount of time. 
Many heuristics have been developed to tackle the problem of winner 
determination in combinatorial auctions. Various models of the problem have been used 
to handle the complexity of the problem. Section 3 describes some of the history and 
methods that have been developed in the past to solve this problem. One of the heuristics 
developed to handle the winner determination problem is the Opportunity Cost 
(OPCOST) algorithm developed by Akcoglu et al [22]. The OPCOST algorithm gives a 
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heuristic solution to the problem in a reasonable amount of time. It is proved to produce 
better solutions than the greedy algorithm for an acceptable increase in the amount of 
computations. 
 The objective of this research is to study the OPCOST algorithm and to improve 
upon the quality of solution produced by the OPCOST algorithm. The effect of the 
number of bids and the number of items on the solution quality will also be studied. Both 
the solution quality and the time of execution for OPCOST and modifications will be 
compared together and studied. 
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Chapter 3. Literature Review 
 
While the winner determination is a NP–Hard problem, it has been well formulated. The 
winner determination problem has been formulated before as a dynamic programming 
problem [6], integer programming problem [6, 7, 9, 18] and a weighted set packing 
problem [8, 13]. De Vries and Vohra [14] gave their formulation of the problem and 
reviewed earlier approaches used to solve the problem. Rothkopf et al [13] modeled the 
problem as a maximum-weight set packing problem and studied the structure of the 
problem. Sandholm [6] modeled the winner determination as a dynamic programming 
problem and formulated an IDA* method to determine the optimal solution to the 
problem. The approach makes use of the sparseness of the search space in the problem 
and structures the branch and bound search so as to consider every possible winning 
combination and selects the best of all the possible winning combinations. The branching 
in the IDA* algorithm is based on the set of items present in each bid. The maximum 
average price of the items in the set is used to provide a bounding on the search space. 
Later, Sandholm [17] formulated another improved method that branches based on the 
bids and not on the items comprising the bids. Both algorithms formulated by Sandholm 
find the optimal winning combination among all the possible winning combinations. The 
execution time for auctions with thousand or more items becomes high.  Jones and 
Koehler [21] formulated the combinatorial auction winner determination problem in a 
television advertisement time slot auction as a constraint satisfaction problem and 
developed heuristics to find the approximate optimal winning combination in an efficient 
manner. 
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Many heuristics have been implemented to find a near optimal solution without 
taking too much processing time. Nissan and Zurel [9] formulated the problem as an 
integer-programming problem. They proposed an approximate linear programming 
method to order the bids based on their desirability. A greedy algorithm was used to 
determine the winning combination from the set of the ordered bids. The approximate 
solution derived from this method had an approximation error of less than 1% compared 
to the solutions obtained by De Vries and Vohra and the processing time required was 
less than a minute for large auctions with 1000 items and 100,000 bids on a Pentium 
450MHZ machine. The heuristic although assumes that all the items in the problem have 
to be allocated and this reduces the problem from a NP – Hard to a NP – Complete 
problem. Sakurai et al [10] proposed another method applying limited discrepancy search 
to Sandholm’s IDA* algorithm to determine the approximate winning combination. The 
limited discrepancy search limits the search to the most promising regions of the 
combinatorial tree. The algorithm is able to find up to a 95% approximate solution in 
about 1% of the time required for the IDA* algorithm. Gonen and Lehmann [18] and 
Leyton-Brown et al [19] suggested improved functions for obtaining tighter bounds in the 
IDA* search tree and limit the search to the most desirable solution areas and other 
heuristics to find out the winning combination. Hoos and Boutilier [8] used stochastic 
local search techniques to solve the winner determination problem and showed that the 
performance and the solution quality where very impressive. 
Akcoglu, et al [22] proposed a general framework to exploit the topological 
structures of the bids to determine the winning bids with a good approximation ratio in 
linear time. They modeled the winner determination problem as a maximum weight 
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independent set problem and have come up with the “Opportunity Cost” and the “Local 
Ratio Opportunity Cost” algorithms to obtain an approximate solution to the problem. 
Both the algorithms return the same approximation of the optimal solution. The set of all 
submitted bids B can be formulated into a conflict bid graph G where the bids are the 
nodes and an edge occurs between any two bids that share the same product. The winning 
solution is one where no two bids of the solution are connected by an edge and the 
optimal solution is the maximum weight solution among all the winning solutions. The 
opportunity cost algorithm is different from the greedy algorithm because of the fact that 
they take into account the cost of excluding previously considered neighbors of a chosen 
node. Since this accounting requires propagating information only between neighbors, it 
increases the running time by at most a small constant factor, and yet in many cases 
produces a great improvement in the approximation ratio.  
The quality of the approximation depends on the local structure of the ordered 
input graph G. For each node v in G, all successors of v (adjacent nodes that appear later 
in the ordering) are examined. The maximum size of any independent set among v and its 
successors is called the directed local independence number at v and is represented by 
β(v), which is the maximum size of any independent set among v and its successors. The 
maximum value of β(v) over all nodes in the graph will be written as β(G) or just β and is 
the directed local independence number of G. the opportunity cost algorithms 
approximate a maximum weight independent set to within a factor of β. By comparison, 
the greedy algorithm approximates a maximum weight independent set within a ratio of 
the maximum size of any independent subset of both the predecessors and the successors 
of any node, which in general can be much larger than . Finding β for any undirected 
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bid graph is again a NP-hard problem on its own. So the bound on the approximation 
ratio even though provable is not easily obtained. The approximation ratio can vary for 
each problem depending upon the structure and size of the problem. 
3.1. Opportunity Cost Algorithm 
 
This section explains the opportunity cost algorithm proposed by Akcoglu et al [22]. Let 
B be the set of all the bids that were submitted in the auction. The bid set B is formulated 
into a directed bid graph G; E represents the set of edges in G. The notation u→v is used 
if uv ∈ E and u is called a predecessor of v and v a successor of u. The set of all 
predecessors of u will be written as P(u) and the set of all successors as S(u). 
Given a directed acyclic graph G0 = (B0,E0) with weights weight(v) for each v in 
B0, the opportunity cost algorithm proceeds in two stages. The opportunity cost method 
OPCOST(G0) is given below. 
OC1 Traverse the nodes according to the topological order of G0. Compute 
value(u) for each node u. value(u) represents an estimate of the gain we 
expect by including u in the independent set. The value(u) is computed by 
taking the weight of u and subtracting an opportunity cost which consists 
of the values of earlier positive-value nodes that conflict with u. 

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OC2 In the reverse topological order, add any node with non-negative value to 
the desired independent set V and discard its predecessors. 
select(u)=[value(u) ≥ 0] ∧ ∀v ∈ S(u) : ¬ select(v) 
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The output of the above algorithm is the set V defined as all u for which select(u) 
is true. Also the output set V is an independent set. 
The opportunity cost algorithm calculates value(v) for each node v in time 
proportional to its in-degree i.e. its number of predecessors and select(v) for each node in 
time proportional to its out-degree i.e. its number of successors. Thus the total time for 
execution of the Opportunity cost algorithm is O(|B0| + |E0|). The opportunity cost 
algorithm approximates the solution problem of the winner determination in 
combinatorial auctions to within a factor of the directed local independence number of 
the bid graph G [22], β. 
3.2. Local Ratio Opportunity Cost Algorithm 
 
The local ratio technique was originally proposed and developed by Bar-Yehuda and 
Even [23] and later extended by Bar-Noy et al [24]. Local ratio technique can be used to 
recursively find approximate solutions to optimization problems over vectors in ℜn, 
subject to a set of feasibility constraints. 
Given a directed acyclic graph G0 = (B0,E0) with weights weight(v) for each v in 
B0, pass (G0, weight(.)) to the following recursive procedure. The procedure takes a graph 
G and a weight function w and proceeds as below 
 
LR1 Delete all nodes in G with non-positive weight. Let this new graph be G2. 
LR2 If G2 has no nodes, return the empty set. 
LR3 Otherwise, select a node u with no predecessors in G2, and decompose the 
weight function w as w = w1 + w2, where 
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And w2 = w – w1. 
LR4 Solve the problem recursively using (G2, w2) as input. Let V2 be the 
approximation to a maximum weight independent set returned by this 
recursive call. 
LR5 If V2 ∪ {u} is an independent set, return V = V2 ∪ {u}. Otherwise, return V 
= V2. 
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Chapter 4. Methodology 
 
This research focuses on the problem of winner determination of combinatorial auctions 
as discussed in Section 2. The problem is proven to be NP-hard and the optimal solution 
cannot generally be computed in linear time. Many efforts have been made towards 
developing heuristics that produce a solution of acceptable quality in a reasonable amount 
of time. The existing approaches are studied and extended to develop a new method to 
formulate an algorithm that produces better quality solutions.  
4.1 Opportunity Cost Algorithm 
 
The opportunity cost algorithm distinguishes itself from the greedy algorithm by taking 
into consideration the cost of excluding previously considered neighbors of a given bid in 
the given directed acyclic graph. The opportunity cost algorithm only increases the run 
time by a small factor since only the neighbors of any node are considered and yet results 
in a considerable improvement in the approximation ratio of the resultant solution.  
Consider the example illustrated in Figure 3. The nodes in the bid graph represent the 
bids and the weights the corresponding bid amounts. The nodes have been ordered in an 
ascending order by weights. The edges in the graph represent the conflicts between the 
bids i.e. bids that share a common item cannot both be in the winning solution and thus 
conflict with each other. The edges always extend from the lower weight bid to the higher 
weight bid and thus are directed. The following steps show the opportunity value 
calculations for each of the node in the bid graph. 
v1 = w1 = 5; 
v2 = w2 – max(0, v1) = 10 – 5 = 5; 
v3 = w3 = 15; 
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v4 = w4 – max(0, v1) – max(0, v2) – max(0, v3) = 27 – 5 – 5 -15 = 2; 
v5 = w5 – max(0, v4) – max(0, v3) = 30 – 2 – 15 = 13; 
v6 = w6 – max(0, v5) – max(0, v2) = 35 – 13 – 5 = 17; 
The winning set is initialized to null. The nodes are traversed in the reverse order and the 
bids that have a positive opportunity cost value and do not conflict with the current 
winning set are combined to form the winning solution. Thus the winning solution for the 
example shown in Figure 3 is {6, 4}. The total revenue from the winning solution is 62, 
which is also the maximum possible revenue from the bid set. 
4.2 Effects of Node Ordering 
 
The performance of the opportunity cost algorithm is strongly related to the order in 
which the nodes are processed. The processing order of the nodes affects the value of 
β(u) for each node u. That is, the topological order of the directed acyclic graph G0 
directly affects the quality of the solution. The node ordering used to form the directed 
acyclic graph G0 from the undirected graph G needs to be paid considerable attention. 
It has been proven [22] that for every undirected bid graph G there exists a 
topological orientation G’ that will produce the maximum independent set of G with the 
opportunity cost algorithm. It has also been shown that formulating the orientation G’ by 
itself is a problem that is equivalent to the maximum independent set problem. Therefore 
any bid graph G can be arranged in an orientation G’ to produce the optimal solution to 
the winner determination problem. Since computing the orientation G’ by itself is a 
maximum independent set problem the bid graph G must be oriented in the best order 
possible so as to obtain small approximation ratios. 
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Figure 3: Example Bid Graph 
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In [22], it has also been proved that when G consists of all distinct value bids, 
then orienting G in order of decreasing weights causes the opportunity cost algorithm to 
return the same solution as the greedy algorithm. 
4.3. Effect of Graph Topology on Opportunity Cost Algorithm 
 
This section studies the effect of different graph topologies on the opportunity cost 
algorithm in an effort to identify and isolate the cases where the opportunity cost 
algorithm fails to produce the maximum independent set. The weights of all the nodes in 
the bid graph are assumed to be positive since the bid amount for any bid in an auction 
cannot be negative. All the following cases of the bid graphs orient the bids in an 
increasing order by weights. Edges always extend from the lower weight bid to the higher 
weight bid. So in a conflict the bid with the lower weight is the predecessor and the 
higher weight bid is the successor. As a result the lowest weight bid does not have any 
predecessors and the highest weight bid does not have any successors. This kind of 
formulation provides us with a directed acyclic graph with all nodes having a positive 
weight value that is the bid amount. This topology or the structure of the bid graph has 
great influence on the quality of the solution produced by the opportunity cost algorithm. 
The following sections study certain structures of the bid graph and their effect on the 
OPCOST solution. 
4.3.1. All Nodes Have Zero or One Predecessor and Successor 
 
Let the number of bids or nodes in the graph be n and the number of edges be e. Since no 
node can have more than one predecessor or successor, we have that e < n. Also we the 
opportunity cost (OPCOST) value for all of the bids is always positive since the 
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predecessor of any bid always has a bid value less than itself. Thus the bid graph can look 
as shown in Figure 4. 
Theorem 1: OPCOST always produces the optimal solution for bid graphs where all 
nodes have zero or one predecessor and successor. 
Proof: In cases, where there are even number of bids the maximum independent set that 
can be formed is 
wn + wn-2 + … + w2 >= wn-1 + wn-3 + … + w1 
Because wn >= wn-1, wn-2 >= wn-3 and so on. And the even numbered bids always have a 
higher weight than the odd numbered values. So, the collective value of all the even 
numbered bids that do not conflict with each other is more than the collective value of the 
odd numbered bids. Substituting any even numbered with an odd numbered bid or 
deleting any bid only reduces the total value. Similarly, with odd number of bids the 
maximum independent set that can be formed is: 
wn + wn-2 + … + w1 >= wn-1 + wn-3 + … + w2 
where wn => weight(n). And the odd numbered bids always have a higher weight than the 
even numbered bids. Therefore, we can infer that wn, the highest weighted bid, is always 
in the optimal solution. When there are two or more disjoint paths in the bid graph, the 
optimal set for each separate path is computed as above and then combined (union 
operation) to obtain the optimal solution set for the entire bid graph.  
The OPCOST values of all the bids in the graph are positive since predecessors 
always have a lesser weight than the successors and no bid has more than one 
predecessor. Since all the bids have a positive value, the OPCOST algorithm selects the 
highest weighted bid to be a part of the winning solution. Thus the set of winning bids  
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Figure 4: All Nodes Have Zero or One Predecessors and Successors. 
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from OPCOST is either the collection of all the even numbered bids for graphs with an 
even number of bids or vice versa. Therefore in both cases, the OPCOST algorithm 
always produces the optimal solution for bid graphs where all nodes have zero or one 
predecessor and successor. 
4.3.2 One Node With Two Successors 
 
In this case, all the nodes in the bid graph have zero or one predecessor except for one 
node with two successors. The bid graph can look the example shown in Figure 5. 
Theorem 2: OPCOST always produces the optimal solution for bid graphs where all 
nodes have zero or one predecessor and successor except for one node with two 
successors. 
Proof: Since no bid in the graph has more than one predecessor, the opportunity cost 
(OPCOST) value for all of the bids in the graph is always positive. Assume that the bid or 
node with two successors is the lowest weighted bid.  
In cases, where there are even number of bids n, it can be observed that one path 
in the graph is odd and the other even. Assume that the odd path has i bids and the even 
path has j bids both including the lowest bid. Therefore, we have i + j – 1 = n. Consider 
the odd path, from Section 4.3.1, we have that the maximum independent set in this path 
is {Bi, Bi-2, … , B1}. Now consider the even path, again from Section 4.3.1, we have that 
the maximum independent set from this path is {Bj, Bj-2, … , B2}. It is evident that the 
maximum independent sets derived above do not conflict and the optimal solution for 
such a bid graph is {{Bi, Bi-2, … , B1}, {Bj, Bj-2, … , B2}}.  
  In cases where there is an odd number of bids n, it can be observed that both paths 
in the graph are either odd or even. Assume that one of the paths has i bids and then the  
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Figure 5: One Node With Two Successors 
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other path has j. Therefore, again we have i + j – 1 = n. When both the paths are even, 
then the maximum independent sets for the two paths are {Bi, Bi-2, … , B2 } and {Bj, Bj-2, 
… , B2}. Since both the sets do not have any bids in common, they can be combined to 
obtain the optimal solution for the entire graph. When both the paths are odd, then the 
maximum independent sets for the two paths are {Bi, Bi-2, … , B1 } and {Bj, Bj-2, … , B1}. 
The maximum independent sets derived above conflict with each other and so cannot be 
combined together as a whole to form the optimal solution. The possible winning 
solutions are 
{{Bi, Bi-2, … , Bi-((i-1)/2) }, {Bj, Bj-2, … , B1}} 
or 
{{Bi, Bi-2, … , B1}, {Bj, Bj-2, … , Bj-((j-1)/2)}}                (Eq. 1) 
{{Bi-1, Bi-3, … , Bi-1-((i-1)/2)  }, {Bj, Bj-2, … , B1}}    (Eq. 2) 
{{Bi, Bi-2, … , B1 }, {Bj-1, Bj-3, … , Bj-1-((j-1)/2) }}    (Eq. 3) 
{{Bi-1, Bi-3, … , Bi-1-((i-1)/2)  }, {Bj-1, Bj-3, … , Bj-1-((j-1)/2) }}   (Eq. 4) 
Since the predecessors always have a lower weight than that of the successor bid, we 
have the following. 
{Bi, Bi-2, … , Bi-((i-1)/2) } > {Bi-1, Bi-3, … , Bi-1-((i-1)/2)}    (Eq. 5) 
{Bj, Bj-2, … , Bj-((j-1)/2)} > {Bj-1, Bj-3, … , Bj-1-((j-1)/2)}    (Eq. 6) 
We can conclude from Equations 5 and 6 that the total value of the bids in Equation 1 is 
greater than that of the bids in Equation 2, 3 and 4. Therefore the union of the maximal 
independent sets from the two odd paths gives us the optimal solution.  
Now we have that the union of the maximal independent set of the two paths 
gives us the optimal solution for graphs where all nodes have zero or one predecessors 
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and successors except for one node with two successors. Since both Bi and Bj are in the 
optimal solution and one of them is the highest weighted bid, we have that the highest 
weighted bid is in the optimal solution.  
The OPCOST values of all the bids in the graph are positive since predecessors 
always have a lesser weight than the successors and no bid has more than one 
predecessor. Since all the bids have a positive value, the OPCOST algorithm selects the 
highest weighted bid in each path and its non-conflicts to be a part of the winning 
solution. Therefore the OPCOST algorithm always produces the optimal solution for bid 
graphs where all nodes have zero or one predecessor and successor. 
It can be proven using section 4.3.1 that the node with two successors can occur 
anywhere in the bid graph with even or odd number of nodes but still the conclusions 
derived above will hold true. 
4.3.3. One Node With Two Predecessors 
 
In this case, all the nodes in the bid graph have zero or one predecessor except for one 
node with two successors. The bid graph can look the example shown in Figure 6. 
Theorem 3: OPCOST always produces the optimal solution for bid graphs where all 
nodes have zero or one predecessor and successor except for one node with two 
predecessors. 
Proof: Since all nodes except one have only one predecessor, it is evident that the 
opportunity cost (OPCOST) value for all of the bids in the graph except for the bid with 
two predecessors is always positive. Assume that the bid or node with two predecessors 
is the highest weighted bid. The bid graph looks as shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: One Node With Two Predecessors. 
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Consider the two paths in the graph with no nodes ignoring the node with two 
predecessors and evaluate the OPCOST for the bids on the two paths as before. Let the 
number of nodes on the two paths be i and j respectively. There are two possible winning 
solutions, one with the node with two predecessors n as part of the solution and the other 
without. When n is part of the winning solution then the winning solution set is  
{{Bn}, {Bi-1, Bi-3, …}, {Bj-1, Bj-3, … }}              (Eq. 7) 
When n is not a part of the winning solution then the winning solution set is 
{{Bi, Bi-2, …}, {Bj, Bj-2, … }}    (Eq.8) 
By opportunity cost principle we have the following 
value(i) = {wi + wi-1+ …} – {wi-1 + wi-3 + …}   (Eq. 9) 
value(j) = {wj + wj-1+ …} – {wj-1 + wj-3 + …}            (Eq. 10) 
The optimal solution is the set with higher total weight of the sets from Equation 7 and 8. 
According to the OPCOST algorithm, if wn > value(i) + value(j) then bid Bn is in the 
winning solution. If value(i) + value(j) > wn then bids Bi and Bj are in the winning 
solution and bid Bn is not. Therefore, the OPCOST algorithm produces the optimal 
solution for bid graphs where all nodes have zero or one predecessors except for one 
node with two predecessors. 
4.3.4. One Node With Two Successors; One Node With Two Predecessors 
 
The scenario dictates that a conflict exists between the node with two successors and the 
node with two predecessors. Let us assume that the bid with two predecessors is the 
highest weighted bid. The resultant bid graph looks as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: One Node With Two Successors; One Node With Two Predecessors. 
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Theorem 4: The optimal solution for bid graphs where all nodes have zero or one 
predecessor and successor except for one node with two predecessors and another with 
two successors always includes the bid with the highest weight. 
Proof: Ignoring the conflict between bid with two successors and the node with two 
predecessors in a graph with odd number of bids we have 
 wn+wn-2+…+wn–i+2+wn–i+wn–i–2+…+w1 >= wn-1+wn-3+…+wn–i+1+wn–i–1+…+w2    (Eq. 11) 
Now, when we consider the excluded or ignored conflict, the term wn–i gets eliminated 
from the left hand side of the above equation 
wn+wn-2+…+wn–i+2+wn–i–2+…+w1                         (Eq. 12) 
and the right hand side of the equation remains the same 
wn-1+wn-3+…+wn–i+1+wn–i–1+…+w2                    (Eq. 13) 
No definite conclusion can be made about the resulting two sides of the above Equation 
11. Another solution set can be formed from Equation 12 and Equation 13 as below 
wn + wn-2 + … + wn–i+2 + wn–i–1+ …+ w2                 (Eq . 14) 
It is evident that Equation 14 > Equation 12 and Equation 14 > Equation 13. Thus 
Equation 14 is the new maximum independent set. 
With even number of bids, 
     wn+wn-2+…+wn–i+2+wn–i+wn–i–2+…+w2 >= wn-1+wn-3+…+wn–i+1+wn–i–1+…+w1   (Eq. 15) 
Now, when we consider the excluded or ignored conflict, the term wn–i gets eliminated 
from the left hand side of the above equation 
wn+wn-2+…+wn–i+2+wn–i–2+…+w2              (Eq. 16) 
and the right hand side of the equation remains the same 
wn-1+wn-3+…+wn–i+1+wn–i–1+…+w1                   (Eq. 17) 
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No definite conclusion can be made about the resulting two sides of the above Equation 
15. Another solution set can be formed from Equation 16 and Equation 17 as below 
wn + wn-2 + … + wn–i+2 + wn–i–1+ …+ w1                  (Eq .18) 
It is evident that Equation 18 > Equation 16 and Equation 18 > Equation 17. Thus 
Equation 18 is the new maximum independent set. Also, it can be observed from 
Equation 14 and Equation 18 that the highest weighted bid Bn is always in the optimal 
solution. 
4.3.5. Double Counting in Opportunity Cost Algorithm 
 
The OPCOST algorithm does not always produce the optimal solution for graphs where 
all nodes have zero or one predecessors and successors except for one bid with two 
successors and another with two predecessors. The OPCOST produces the optimal 
solution in graphs where there is odd number of bids between the node with two 
successors and the node with two predecessors. When there is even number of bids 
between the node with two predecessors and the node with two successors, the OPCOST 
algorithm outputs a less than optimal solution. The example illustrated in Figure 8 is used 
to demonstrate one of the simple scenarios where the Opportunity Cost algorithm 
deviates from the optimal. 
In the example illustrated in Figure 9, 
v1 =  w1 = 1001; 
v2 = w2 – max(0, v1) = w2 – w1 = 1; 
v3 = w3 – max(0, v2) = w3 – w2 + w1 = 1002; 
v4 = w4 – max(0, v3) = w4 – w3 + w2 – w1 = 2; 
v5 = w5 – max(0, v4) = w5 – w4 +w3 – w2 + w1 = 1003; 
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Figure 8: Bid Graph With Double Counting 
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v6 = w6 – max(0,v5) – max(0,v3)= w6 –w5 + w4 – w3 + w2 – w1 –w3 +w2 –w1 = -999; 
Where vn => value(n). Since v6 is negative the opportunity cost algorithm skips B6 and 
selects {B5, B3, B1} to be the winning solution. But it has been proved in Section 4.3.4 
that for the above problem the highest weighted bid is always in the solution. Observing 
the equation to calculate v6, we see that the weights of B3 and B1 have been subtracted 
twice in the same equation while the weight of B2 has been added twice. In this case, the 
double counting of the weight values of certain nodes had lead to the non-optimality of 
the independent set generated by the opportunity cost algorithm. As the problem size 
grows and the conflict graph gets more interwoven, the double counting phenomenon 
actually helps the OPCOST algorithm reach better solutions. But eliminating double 
counting does not lead to a better solution all the time. The double counting phenomenon 
either helps or defeats the approximation ratio achieved by the opportunity cost algorithm 
depending on the problem structure or the topology of the bid graph. When an algorithm 
eliminating the double counting was run on the sample dataset described in Section 5, 
only a few problems resulted in a better solution than the OPCOST but for most problems 
the results obtained were much worse than the OPCOST results. 
4.3.6. Effect Of Node Removal 
 
After the opportunity cost is calculated for each bid in the graph, the OPCOST algorithm 
uses the OPCOST values for each bid as a decision variable. All the bids with negative 
values are not considered and only bids with positive values are evaluated. The first 
positive bid in the descending order of bid amount is included to be a part of the winning 
solution. The list is then traversed down and all positive value bids that do not conflict 
with the current winning solution set are added to be a part of the winning solution. The 
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result is a set of independent bids that form the winning solution. As each bid gets added 
to the winning solution, their conflicts are eliminated out of contention, that is, they 
cannot be a part of the winning solution anymore. But the OPCOST algorithm ignores the 
fact and uses the OPCOST values that are influenced by the eliminated bids to decide 
whether a bid is part of the winning solution or not. Removing the bid that is selected to 
be part of the winning solution and its conflicts from the entire bid list reduces the 
number of bids that are still under consideration. Recalculating the OPCOST values for 
the remaining bids updates the values to reflect only the current list of bids and eliminates 
the effect of the discarded bids. This updated OPCOST value serves as a better decision 
variable than the old values and improves the quality of the winning solution 
considerably. The reduced number of bids on which the OPCOST algorithm is executed 
as the winning bids are selected, results in smaller graphs and reduces chances of double 
counting errors. 
4.4. Recursive Recalculation in OPCOST (OPCOST-R) 
 
This research introduces one of the suggested modifications to the opportunity cost 
algorithm. The recursive recalculation method involves rerunning the opportunity cost 
algorithm on the remaining bids after the first bid is selected to be a part of the solution 
set and eliminating itself and its predecessors from the bid graph. Although the recursive 
recalculation involves more calculations, the algorithm is still polynomial in time. The 
total time of execution for the opportunity cost algorithm has been shown in Section 4.1 
to be O(|B0| + |E0|). Therefore, the total time of execution for the opportunity cost 
algorithm with recalculation is less than O(|B0|*(|B0| + |E0|)). In practice the time for 
execution is never this high because the selected bid and its conflicts get discarded after 
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each selection. This reduces the number of bids in contention with each selection. The 
conflict density of the graph also has a great influence on the execution time. The time 
for execution decreases as the conflict density of the graph increases. The algorithm for 
the recursive recalculation proceeds as listed below. 
Given a directed acyclic graph G0 = (B0, E0) with weights weight(v) for each B0, 
the opportunity cost algorithm with recalculation is initialized with an empty set to be the 
winning independent set V and proceeds as follows: 
ROC1 If the input graph G0 has no nodes, go to step ROC 6. 
ROC2 Traverse the nodes according to the topological order of G0. Compute 
value(u) for each node u. value(u) represents an estimate of the gain we 
expect by including u in the independent set. The value(u) is computed by 
taking the weight of u and subtracting an opportunity cost which consists 
of the values of earlier positive-value nodes that conflict with u. 

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ROC3 Processing the nodes in the reverse order, add the first node u with a non-
negative value to the set V i.e., V = V ∪ {u} 
ROC4 Delete {u} and all predecessors of {u} from the bid graph G resulting in a 
new bid graph G1 i.e. G1 = G0 – {u} – P(u). 
ROC5 Go to step ROC1 with G1 as the input graph. 
ROC6 Return V. 
 
 Consider the example illustrated in Figure 9. The bid graph shown in the example 
has the same structure as the example shown in Figure 3. But the bid amount associated  
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Figure 9: Opportunity Cost Recalculation Example 
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with each bid is different from the example in Figure 3. The opportunity cost calculation 
for bid is shown below. 
v1 = w1 = 1; 
v2 = w2 – v1 = 20 – 1 = 19; 
v3 = w3 = 22; 
v4 = w4 – v1 – v2 – v3 = 24 – 1 – 19 -22 = -18; 
v5 = w5 – v4 – v3 = 25 – 22 = 3; 
v6 = w6 – v5 – v2 = 28 – 3 – 19 = 6; 
The winning solution according to OPCOST algorithm is {6, 3, 1}. The total revenue of 
the OPCOST winning solution is 51. But the maximum total revenue that can be obtained 
from the problem in Figure 9 is 52 from the winning set {6, 4} and not 51 from the set 
{6, 3, 1}. Applying the OPCOST-R algorithm on the same problem we get the same 
opportunity cost values for all the bids as the OPCOST before any bid is chosen to be in 
the winning set. So, again by OPCOST-R, the bid 6 is added to winning set. But once the 
bid 6 is added to the winning solution, the OPCOST-R recalculates the opportunity cost 
values for the remaining bids in the problem excluding bid 6 and its conflicts. The 
remaining bid graph after choosing bid 6 is shown in Figure 9. Now the new opportunity 
cost values for the remaining bids is calculated as shown below. 
v1 = w1 = 1; 
v3 = w3 = 22; 
v4 = w4 – v1 – v3 = 24 – 22 – 1 = 1; 
Since bid 4 has a positive vale, it is selected to be a part of the winning solution. Adding 
bid 4 to the winning solution and eliminating its conflicts leaves no remaining bids; thus 
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the winning set by the OPCOST-R algorithm is {6, 4} with a total revenue of 52 which is 
the same as the maximum total revenue for the problem and also better than the result 
produced by the OPCOST algorithm. 
4.5. Maximum Total Revenue Using OPCOST (MTR) 
This section introduces another method considered for calculating the winning bids in a 
combinatorial auction. The new method uses the opportunity cost algorithm to find out 
the maximum independent set for each node in the bid graph that includes the current 
node itself. The MTR algorithm is based on the principle that the opportunity cost 
algorithm delivers better results for smaller graphs. The approximation ratio of the 
OPCOST algorithm is based on β. Thus reducing the size of the graph on which the 
OPCOST algorithm operates also reduces β thereby increasing the accuracy of the 
OPCOST algorithm. The MTR algorithm uses the OPCOST algorithm to find out the 
maximal independent set among the non-conflicts for each bid. The size of the graph for 
only the non-conflicts of each bid is less than that of the entire graph and thereby the 
resultant set is closer to the optimal. If OPCOST calculates the optimal solution to the 
maximal independent set among the non-conflicts for each bid, then MTR will produce 
an optimal solution. This increased accuracy in calculating the MTR for each bid results 
in better decision variable values when selecting the winning solution. The bid graph G in 
this case is just an undirected graph with no specific orientation. The set of all the 
conflicting bids to the bid u is represented as C(u) and the set of all non-conflicting bids 
to the bid u is represented as C’(u). The maximal independent set for each node including 
the node itself is obtained by applying the opportunity cost algorithm to only the non-
conflict bids of the current node C’ (u). The value value(u) for each node now becomes 
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the total weight of the maximum independent set including u. Once the value(u) for all 
the nodes have been calculated, then the node with the highest value(u) is selected to be 
part of the winning solution. The selected bid and its conflicts are then eliminated from 
the bid graph and the value(u) for each node calculated again. The process is repeated till 
the bid graph G is empty. Although this method significantly increases the total time of 
execution, it may be justified by the improved solution quality. 
Given an undirected graph G = (B, E) with weights weight(v) for each B, the 
method is initialized with an empty set to be the winning independent set V and proceeds 
as follows: 
NOC1 If the input graph G has no nodes, go to step NOC 6. 
NOC2 Traverse the nodes according to the topological order of G0. Compute 
value(u) for each node u. value(u) represents an estimate of the total 
revenue we expect by including u in the independent set. The set of non-
conflicting bids for u given by C’(u) is oriented in the order of increasing 
weights to obtain the directed acyclic graph C0’(u). The value(u) is 
computed by adding the weight of u to the maximum independent set 
returned by OPCOST(C0’ (u)). 
NOC3 Add the node u with the highest value(u) to the set V i.e., V = V ∪ {u} 
NOC4 Delete {u} and all conflicts of {u} i.e., C(u) from the bid graph G resulting 
in a new bid graph G1 i.e. G1 = G – {u} – C(u). 
NOC5 Go to step NOC1 with G1 as the input graph. 
NOC6 Return V. 
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Chapter 5. Results 
 
As a part of this research, a number of experiments have been performed on a C# 
implementation of the algorithms. The original opportunity cost algorithm and the 
suggested improvements have been implemented and the solution quality and the 
execution time have been recorded to compare the performance of the variations. The 
algorithms were tested on a large data set provided by De Vries and Vohra [14]. 
5.1. Problem Dataset 
 
The problem dataset provided by De Vries and Vohra uses five different distributions, 
where each distribution consists of sequence of problem sizes, varying both the number 
of bids as well as the number of bids. The problem size is defined as the total number of 
items in bids, which is different from the product of the number of items with the number 
of bids. Many replications or problems are available for each combination of the number 
of items and the number of bids. The results for the algorithms have individually reported 
for each of the distributions separately since the type of distribution can affect the time of 
execution and the solution quality.  
More problems with increasing number of bids were formed from various 
combinations of the random distribution datasets provided by De Vries and Vohra. These 
bigger problems had the number of bids increasing in steps of thousands from 2000 to 
8000 to study the performance of all the discussed algorithms with respect to solution 
quality and time of execution. 
5.2. Types of Distribution in Dataset 
 
The problem dataset is characterized by four different classes of distributions. The 
number of items and the number of bids and their values were chosen based on the 
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distribution. The distribution type and the variations of the problem instances are 
explained in the following sections. The results for problems within each distribution 
type have been recorded and compared for the different algorithms. The effects of the 
number of items and the number of bids in a problem on the solution quality and the time 
of execution are also plotted and studied. 
5.2.1 Random 
 
For each bid, the number of items is randomly selected from 1 … m. The selected number 
of items is randomly picked without replacement. The bid values are randomly selected 
from [0, 1]. The dataset contains 240 problems of this type. The values in Table 1 show 
the combinations of the number of items and the number of bids present in the dataset 
along with the number of problem instances for each combination. 
5.2.2 Weighted Random 
 
For each bid, the number of items is randomly selected from 1 … m. The selected number 
of items is randomly picked without replacement. The bid values are randomly selected 
from [0, number of items in bid]. The dataset contains 320 problems of this type. The 
values in Table 3 show the combinations of the number of items, the number of bids and 
the number of items in each bid present in the dataset along with the number of problem 
instances for each combination. 
5.2.3 Uniform 
 
For each bid, the number of items is randomly selected from 1 … m. The selected number 
of items is randomly picked without replacement. The bid values are randomly selected 
from [0, 1]. The dataset contains 660 problems of this type. The values in Table 4 show 
the combinations of the number of items, the number of bids and the number of items in 
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each bid present in the dataset along with the number of problem instances for each 
combination. 
5.2.4 Decay 
 
For each bid, one random item is added. Then a new random item is repeatedly added 
with a chosen probability α until an item isn’t added or the bid contains all m items. The 
bid values are randomly selected from [0, number of items in bid]. The dataset contains 
1040 problems of this type. The values in Table 5 show the combinations of the number 
of items, the number of bids and the decay value as a percentage value present in the 
dataset along with the number of problem instances for each combination. 
5.3 Experimental Results 
 
This section produces the results of the opportunity cost algorithm, opportunity cost 
algorithm with recalculation and the Maximum Total Revenue algorithm for the dataset 
described above. All problems were solved using a computer running Microsoft 
Windows XP operating system and equipped with a Pentium 3.06GHZ processor with 1 
GB of RAM. For each of the algorithms the result and the time of execution were 
recorded and compared. 
5.3.1 Random Distribution Results 
 
The OPCOST, OPCOST-R and MTR algorithms were run on all the 240 problem 
datasets available for the random distribution class. The OPCOST with recalculation 
performed consistently better than the OPCOST algorithm although occasionally the 
OPCOST solution was better than the OPCOST-R solution. The OPCOST-R algorithm 
produced better results for 199 problems out of the 240 and similar results for 18 
problems. OPCOST did better than the OPCOST-R for the remaining 23 problems out of 
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the 240. Table 1 summarizes the results of the OPCOST and OPCOST-R to present a 
better understanding of the performances of the OPCOST-R algorithm. The table also 
presents the number of cases where the OPCOST-R was better, worse and the same as the 
OPCOST algorithm. The average increase in execution time for OPCOST-R was 4.07%. 
On the other hand, the algorithm produced solutions that were on an average 11.34% 
better than the OPCOST results.  
 The MTR algorithm produced better or equal results to the OPCOST algorithm 
for all the 240 problems in the random distribution dataset. MTR outputted better results 
than the OPCOST algorithm for 228 problems out of the 240 and produced the same 
results as the OPCOST for the remaining 12 cases.  The MTR solutions were on an 
average 15.48% better than the OPCOST results. Table 2 summarizes the MTR results 
with respect the OPCOST results with varying number of items and bids. 
5.3.2 Weighted Random Results 
 
The results generated by OPCOST, OPCOST-R and the MTR algorithms on all of the 
320 weighted random distribution class problems were identical. The weighted random 
distribution problems have a structure similar to that of the random distribution but the 
weights of associated with each bid is proportional to the number of items in the bid. The 
results show that the solution quality depends not only on the structure of the problem but 
also on the weights or the bid amounts associated with each bid. The results produced by 
all algorithms were identical irrespective of the different combinations of the varying 
number of bids and items in the problem. Table 3 summarizes the OPCOST and 
OPCOST-R results for the weighted random distribution class of problems with varying 
number of items and bids. 
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Table 1: Random Distribution Class Problem Results For OPCOST-R 
Items Bids Replications 
Average increase in 
solution quality 
OPCOST-R 
% 
No. Of problems 
with worse results 
OPCOST-R 
No. Of problems 
with identical 
results OPCOST-R 
No. Of problems 
with better results 
OPCOST-R 
100 1000 20 18.64 0 1 19 
100 500 20 14.04 1 0 19 
100 750 20 13.76 3 1 16 
200 1000 20 11.89 2 0 18 
200 500 20 14.35 1 1 18 
200 750 20 8.32 4 0 16 
300 1000 20 12.93 2 0 18 
300 500 20 7.93 2 4 14 
300 750 20 10.15 2 2 16 
400 1000 20 9.28 5 1 14 
400 500 20 5.55 0 7 13 
400 750 20 9.31 1 1 18 
 
Table 2: Random Distribution Class Problem Results For MTR 
Items Bids Replications 
Average increase in 
solution quality 
OPCOST-R 
% 
No. Of problems 
with worse results 
OPCOST-R 
No. Of problems 
with identical 
results OPCOST-R 
No. Of problems 
with better results 
OPCOST-R 
100 1000 20 23.28 0 0 20 
100 500 20 16.89 0 1 19 
100 750 20 21.48 0 1 19 
200 1000 20 14.73 0 0 20 
200 500 20 18.14 0 0 20 
200 750 20 12.24 0 2 18 
300 1000 20 15.9 0 0 20 
300 500 20 9.88 0 3 17 
300 750 20 18.47 0 1 19 
400 1000 20 13.18 0 1 19 
400 500 20 9.52 0 3 17 
400 750 20 12.09 0 0 20 
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Table 3: Weighted Random Distribution Class Problem Results For OPCOST-R 
Items Bids Replications 
Average increase in 
solution quality 
OPCOST-R 
% 
No. Of problems 
with worse results 
OPCOST-R 
No. Of problems 
with identical results 
OPCOST-R 
100 500 20 0 0 20 
100 1000 20 0 0 20 
100 1500 20 0 0 20 
100 2000 20 0 0 20 
200 500 20 0 0 20 
200 1000 20 0 0 20 
200 1500 20 0 0 20 
200 2000 20 0 0 20 
300 500 20 0 0 20 
300 1000 20 0 0 20 
300 1500 20 0 0 20 
300 2000 20 0 0 20 
400 500 20 0 0 20 
400 1000 20 0 0 20 
400 1500 20 0 0 20 
400 2000 20 0 0 20 
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5.3.3 Uniform Distribution Results 
 
The results for all of the 660 problems of the uniform distribution class were identical for 
the OPCOST, OPCOST-R and the MTR algorithms. The results produced by all 
algorithms were identical irrespective of the different combinations of the varying 
number of bids and items in the problem. The uniform distribution problems have a 
smaller number of items in each bid when compared to the random distribution problems, 
leading it to reduce the number of conflicts that exist between the bids. The reduced 
number of conflicts causes all the algorithms to output the same results. Table 4 
summarizes the OPCOST and OPCOST-R results for the uniform random distribution 
class of problems which remain the same in the case of MTR results for the problems. 
5.3.4 Decay Distribution Results 
 
The dataset for the random distribution class consisted of 1040 problems. The OPCOST-
R algorithm performed better than the OPCOST algorithm for 589 problems out of the 
1040 and the results were identical for 404 problems. The results for the OPCOST 
algorithm were better than the OPCOST-R algorithm for 47 out of the 1040 problems. 
Table 5 and 6 summarizes the results of the OPCOST and OPCOST-R to present a better 
understanding of the performances of the OPCOST-R algorithms. The MTR algorithm on 
the other hand always produced equal or better results than the OPCOST algorithm for all 
the 1040 problems with varying number of items and bids. Table 7 and 8 summarizes the 
results of the MTR algorithm against the OPCOST results for the decay distribution class 
of problems. In decay distribution problems, the number of items in a bid increases with 
 thus increasing the number of conflicts. It can be observed from the tables that for both 
the OPCOST-R and the MTR algorithm, the solution quality increases with . 
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Table 4: Uniform distribution Class Problem Results For OPCOST-R 
Items Bids Alpha % Replications 
Average increase 
in solution quality 
OPCOST-R 
% 
No. Of problems 
with worse results 
OPCOST-R 
No. Of problems 
with identical 
results OPCOST-
R 
No. Of problems 
with better results 
OPCOST-R 
25 50 3 20 0 0 20 0 
25 100 3 20 0 0 20 0 
25 150 3 20 0 0 20 0 
50 50 3 20 0 0 20 0 
50 100 3 20 0 0 20 0 
50 150 3 20 0 0 20 0 
75 50 3 20 0 0 20 0 
75 50 8 20 0 0 20 0 
75 50 13 20 0 0 20 0 
75 100 3 20 0 0 20 0 
75 100 8 20 0 0 20 0 
75 100 13 20 0 0 20 0 
75 150 3 20 0 0 20 0 
75 150 8 20 0 0 20 0 
75 150 13 20 0 0 20 0 
100 50 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 100 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 150 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 500 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 600 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 700 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 750 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 800 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 850 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 900 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 950 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 1000 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 1050 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 1100 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 1150 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 1200 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 1250 3 20 0 0 20 0 
100 1300 3 20 0 0 20 0 
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Table 5: Decay Distribution Class Problem Results For OPCOST-R 
Items Bids Alpha % Replications 
Average increase 
in solution quality 
OPCOST-R 
% 
No. Of problems 
with worse results 
OPCOST-R 
No. Of problems 
with identical 
results OPCOST-
R 
No. Of problems 
with better results 
OPCOST-R 
50 50 55 20 2.91 1 7 12 
50 100 55 20 9.48 1 0 19 
50 150 55 20 5.74 2 1 17 
50 200 55 20 6.06 1 2 17 
100 50 5 20 0 0 20 0 
100 50 15 20 0.04 0 19 1 
100 50 25 20 0.17 0 18 2 
100 50 35 20 0.26 0 14 6 
100 50 45 20 2.75 0 8 12 
100 50 55 20 1.12 1 11 8 
100 50 65 20 4.12 0 8 12 
100 50 75 20 7.75 1 4 15 
100 50 85 20 8.46 0 5 15 
100 50 95 20 0 0 20 0 
100 100 5 20 0.01 0 19 1 
100 100 15 20 0.11 0 15 5 
100 100 25 20 0.26 1 13 6 
100 100 35 20 2.93 0 8 12 
100 100 45 20 1.86 1 5 14 
100 100 55 20 4.32 4 0 16 
100 100 65 20 6.55 0 2 18 
100 100 75 20 9.33 1 1 18 
100 100 85 20 8.01 1 2 17 
100 100 95 20 0 0 20 0 
100 150 5 20 0.02 0 17 3 
100 150 15 20 0.17 0 13 7 
100 150 25 20 1.4 4 8 8 
100 150 35 20 1.79 0 7 13 
100 150 45 20 2.5 1 6 13 
100 150 55 20 5.48 2 2 16 
100 150 65 20 11.18 0 0 20 
100 150 75 20 9.77 3 1 16 
100 150 85 20 12.91 0 2 18 
100 150 95 20 0 0 20 0 
100 200 5 20 0.02 0 19 1 
100 200 15 20 0.2 0 14 6 
100 200 25 20 2.14 0 10 10 
100 200 35 20 3.04 1 4 15 
100 200 45 20 5.22 2 2 16 
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Table 6: Decay Distribution Class Problem Results For OPCOST-R (contd.) 
Items Bids Alpha % Replications 
Average increase 
in solution quality 
OPCOST-R 
% 
No. Of problems 
with worse results 
OPCOST-R 
No. Of problems 
with identical 
results OPCOST-
R 
No. Of problems 
with better results 
OPCOST-R 
100 200 55 20 3.79 3 0 17 
100 200 65 20 9.91 4 0 16 
100 200 75 20 14.18 0 0 20 
100 200 85 20 12.3 0 1 19 
100 200 95 20 0.07 0 18 2 
150 50 55 20 2.05 1 13 6 
150 100 55 20 2.49 1 4 15 
150 150 55 20 5.54 1 1 18 
150 200 55 20 5.99 3 2 15 
200 50 55 20 1.71 2 5 13 
200 100 55 20 2.37 1 9 10 
200 150 55 20 3.67 1 3 16 
200 200 55 20 5.59 2 1 17 
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Table 7: Decay Distribution Class Problem Results For MTR 
Items Bids Alpha % Replications 
Average increase 
in solution quality 
MTR 
% 
No. Of problems 
with worse results 
MTR 
No. Of problems 
with identical 
results MTR 
No. Of problems 
with better results 
MTR 
50 50 55 20 4.22 0 7 13 
50 100 55 20 13.67 0 0 20 
50 150 55 20 9.41 0 1 19 
50 200 55 20 10.18 0 1 19 
100 50 5 20 0.08 0 19 1 
100 50 15 20 0.05 0 18 2 
100 50 25 20 0.17 0 17 3 
100 50 35 20 0.89 0 11 9 
100 50 45 20 3.25 0 8 12 
100 50 55 20 1.51 0 10 10 
100 50 65 20 5.17 0 7 13 
100 50 75 20 8.98 0 1 19 
100 50 85 20 12.77 0 3 17 
100 50 95 20 0.03 0 19 1 
100 100 5 20 0.01 0 19 1 
100 100 15 20 0.22 0 14 6 
100 100 25 20 0.35 0 14 6 
100 100 35 20 3.28 0 6 14 
100 100 45 20 4.96 0 4 16 
100 100 55 20 5.68 1 0 19 
100 100 65 20 9.19 0 1 19 
100 100 75 20 14.98 0 1 19 
100 100 85 20 16.15 0 2 18 
100 100 95 20 0 0 20 0 
100 150 5 20 0.03 0 16 4 
100 150 15 20 0.21 0 12 8 
100 150 25 20 2.32 0 10 10 
100 150 35 20 2.58 0 6 14 
100 150 45 20 3.75 0 4 16 
100 150 55 20 8.73 0 1 19 
100 150 65 20 15.13 0 0 20 
100 150 75 20 13.39 0 1 19 
100 150 85 20 23.37 0 1 19 
100 150 95 20 0 0 20 0 
100 200 5 20 0.09 0 17 3 
100 200 15 20 0.29 0 12 8 
100 200 25 20 2.96 0 8 12 
100 200 35 20 4.59 0 2 18 
100 200 45 20 8.74 0 1 19 
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Table 8: Decay Distribution Class Problem Results For MTR (contd.) 
Items Bids Alpha % Replications 
Average increase 
in solution quality 
MTR 
% 
No. Of problems 
with worse results 
MTR 
No. Of problems 
with identical 
results MTR 
No. Of problems 
with better results 
MTR 
100 200 55 20 6.99 0 1 19 
100 200 65 20 15.91 0 1 19 
100 200 75 20 17.49 0 0 20 
100 200 85 20 21.63 0 0 20 
100 200 95 20 0.3 0 18 2 
150 50 55 20 2.46 0 12 8 
150 100 55 20 4.05 0 3 17 
150 150 55 20 7.32 0 1 19 
150 200 55 20 8.33 0 1 19 
200 50 55 20 2.73 0 6 14 
200 100 55 20 3.22 0 6 14 
200 150 55 20 5.11 0 2 18 
200 200 55 20 7.32 0 1 19 
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5.3.5. Results On Bigger Problems 
 
The dataset for the bigger problems belongs to the random distribution class and was 
formed by combining various problems of the random distribution class to obtain 
problems with larger number of bids. The problems have the number of bids in the 
problems ranging from 2000 to 8000 and increasing in steps of thousand. The number of 
items in the problem was also varied along with number of bids from 100 to 300 in steps 
of 100. The time of execution for the problems were recorded and compared both as a 
factor of the number of bids and the number of items. The time of calculation for 
OPCOST-R was observed to be not significantly higher than the OPCOST time for the 
larger problems and the rate of increase of the execution time remained similar to that of 
the OPCOST algorithm. But the OPCOST-R algorithm always produced much better 
results for larger problems than the smaller problems provided De Vries and Vohra where 
OPCOST-R sometimes produced worse results than OPCOST. The MTR took 
significantly more time than both the OPCOST and the OPCOST-R algorithms and the 
execution time increased rapidly with the number of bids in the problem but again the 
algorithm always produced significantly better results than OPCOST algorithm. Table 9 
summarizes the solution quality of the OPCOST-R and MTR algorithm results compared 
to the OPCOST algorithm for the bigger problems dataset. It can be observed that the 
solution quality for both the MTR and the OPCOST-R compared to the OPCOST 
algorithm has significantly increased for the bigger problems. Table 10 summarizes the 
execution time for the OPCOST, OPCOST-R and MTR algorithm with varying number 
of bids and items in the problems. 
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Table 9: Results For Bigger Problems – Solution Quality 
Average increase in solution quality % vs. OPCOST 
Number of Items 
100 200 300 
 
OPCOST-R MTR OPCOST-R MTR OPCOST-R MTR 
1000 18.64 23.28 11.89 14.73 12.93 15.9 
2000 21.07 22.81 19.77 23.55 16.3 20.63 
3000 21.46 23.52 22.32 20.96 21.59 25.28 
4000 24.02 22.04 19.08 18.27 17.29 18.13 
5000 15.96 19.52 16.50 15.29 18.04 18.88 
6000 31.09 32.98 20.36 20.05 21.34 19.27 N
u
m
be
r 
o
f B
id
s 
7000 16.31 18.49 11.53 14.31 17.47 17.47 
 
Table 10: Results For Bigger Problems – Execution Time 
Average time for execution 
Number of Items 
100 200 300 
 
OPCOST OPCOST-R MTR OPCOST 
OPCOST-
R MTR OPCOST 
OPCOST-
R MTR 
1000 2.49 2.75 10.48 4.20 4.42 13.82 5.81 5.95 16.98 
2000 10.05 12.36 69.31 17.41 18.70 83.82 23.65 25.66 95.08 
3000 24.39 28.92 227.5 40.10 46.04 260.72 55.01 62.69 289.19 
4000 42.47 54.55 547.81 76.46 95.65 773.72 115.50 136.99 606.62 
5000 65.16 91.45 966 141.32 136.87 1028.24 187.06 196.07 1168.47 
6000 94.07 110.91 1673.66 179.31 230.42 1870.9 253.47 313.27 2044.92 
7000 129.06 190.90 2679.25 286.74 351.07 2859.54 351.75 434.92 2925.35 
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f B
id
s 
8000 171.98 344.22 3976.31 280.89 319.02 4177.16 493.5 541.625 4386.67 
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Chapter 6. Analysis  
 
This section analyses the results of the OPCOST, OPCOST-R and the MTR algorithms 
on the various different datasets. Trends in solution quality and time for execution are 
observed with respect to the number of items and the number of bids in the problem. 
6.1. Solution Quality With Respect to Optimal 
 
The difference between the optimal solution and the solution produced by the 
approximate algorithm is an important factor when evaluating the performance of the 
algorithm. This section compares the quality of the solution produced by the OPCOST, 
OPCOST-R and the MTR compared to the actual optimal solution of the problems. The 
optimal solution was obtained by a depth-first search on the problem. The problem 
dataset used for the depth- first search algorithm had problems containing 100 items and 
50, 100 or 150 bids with 60 replications for each combination. Figure 10 shows the 
solution quality of the OPCOST, OPCOST-R and MTR algorithms with respect to the 
optimal solution on problems with 50, 100 and 150 bids. The X-axis is the various 
problem instance numbers ordered by size. The Y-axis is the percentage of the optimal 
solution outputted by the algorithms for the various problem instances. The X-axis is the 
problem number where the problems are ordered by size and the Y-axis is the percentage 
of the solution to the optimal solution. Table 11 summarizes the results of the algorithms 
with respect to the optimal solution. All algorithms produce acceptable quality solutions 
for the smaller problems compared to the optimal solution and also the variations in the 
solution quality are quite random. It can be observed from Figure 10 and Table 11 that as 
the number of bids in the problem increases, the solution quality of all three algorithms 
begins to degrade. The MTR algorithm produced optimal results for all except one  
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Figure 10: Solution Quality By Problem Size 
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Table 11: Comparison With The Optimal Solution 
Average Percentile of the optimal solution 
 OPCOST OPCOST-R MTR 
50 
Items 96.38 98.008 99.84 
100 
Items 95.10 97.88 99.96 
150 
Items 93.29 97.73 99.64 
 
 64
problem with 50 bids and with 100 and 150 bids the MTR algorithm produced less than 
optimal results 5 and 11 times respectively out of 60 problems. The OPCOST-R 
produced less than optimal results 16, 26 and 26 times and the OPCOST 26, 43 and 47 
times with 50, 100 and 150 items respectively. Thus it the OPCOST algorithm delivers 
close to optimal solutions for smaller problems and the solution quality begins to 
decrease as the size of the problem increases. The MTR remains close to optimal for 
smaller problems and the solution quality decreases as the size of the problem increases. 
Also MTR performs much better than OPCOST and OPCOST-R for the smaller 
problems. OPCOST-R produces better results than the OPCOST but is typically not as 
close to the optimal solution as MTR. 
6.2. Solution Quality On Distributions 
 
The OPCOST-R and the MTR algorithms output the same results as the OPCOST 
algorithm for all of the uniform and weighted distribution sets with 660 and 320 problems 
respectively. But for the random and decay distributions the OPCOST-R and the MTR 
algorithms performed better then the OPCOST algorithms. For the random distribution 
dataset containing 240 problems of varying bids and items size the solution quality 
increased on an average by 11.34% for the OPCOST-R and by 15.48% for the MTR 
algorithm. In the case of the decay distribution dataset containing 1040 problems of 
varying items and bids size, the solution quality increases on an average by 3.99% and 
6.04% for the OPCOST-R and MTR algorithms respectively. Figure 11 shows the 
performance of the OPCOST-R and the MTR algorithms against the OPCOST results. 
The X-axis is the problem number in increasing order and the Y-axis is the percentage of 
the solution produced by the algorithm to that of the OPCOST solution. The OPCOST-R  
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Figure 11: Solution Quality By Distribution Class 
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performed consistently better than the OPCOST algorithm on random distribution 
datasets for most problems but produced results lesser results than the OPCOST 
algorithm for 23 problems out of 240 and on the decay distribution dataset it produced 
less optimal results than the OPCOST algorithm for 46 problems out of 1040. It can be 
observed from Figure 11 although the OPCOST-R sometimes outputs lesser results than 
the OPCOST as the problem size gets larger OPCOST-R always performs better than 
OPCOST. In the cases of the uniform and the weighted distribution the OPCOST-R 
algorithm outputted the same results for all problems in the dataset. The MTR algorithm 
on the other hand always produced solutions that are better than the OPCOST algorithm 
for all distribution types including random and decay distributions. 
6.3. Execution Time 
 
Figure 12 and 13 shows the execution time for OPCOST, OPCOST-R and the MTR 
against increasing number of bids and items in the problem respectively. In the figure the 
X-axis is the number of bids in the problem in increasing order and the Y-axis is the 
amount of time in seconds required for execution. The execution time for the algorithms 
is compared over the bigger problems dataset with 2000 to 8000 bids in each problem 
with various combinations of the number of items. As can be observed from Figure 12 
and 13, the execution time for the MTR algorithm is much greater than the execution 
time for both the OPCOST and OPCOST-R and increases rapidly with increasing number 
of bids. The OPCOST-R algorithm does take longer time to execute than the OPCOST 
but only marginally higher than the OPCOST and increases similar to OPCOST with the 
number of bids in the problem. Both the OPCOST-R and the MTR algorithms although 
taking longer to execute than the OPCOST produce significantly better results than the 
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OPCOST algorithm in most problems, thus potentially justifying their increased time for 
execution. Figure 12 and 13 illustrate the rate of increase of the execution time with 
respect to the increasing number of bids for all the algorithms. For OPCOST and 
OPCOST-R the increase in execution time is close to linear with the number of bids. The 
increase in time for the MTR algorithm with increasing number of bids in the problem is 
shown in Figure 12. Thus the MTR algorithm, although producing consistently better 
results than the OPCOST algorithm, is limited in use for problems with large number of 
bids because of the rapid increase of the associated execution time. Also it can be 
observed that the quality of solution produced by the OPCOST-R with respect to the 
OPCOST solution becomes better with increasing number of bids. The execution time for 
the algorithms was also studied as a factor of the number of items in the problems. Figure 
14 shows the average time for execution for OPCOST, OPCOST-R and MTR with 
increasing number of items. The X-axis in the graph is the number of items in the 
problem in increasing order and the Y-axis is the amount of time in seconds required to 
execute. The execution time in all three algorithms can be observed to be almost linearly 
increasing with the increasing number of items in the problem. 
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Figure 12: Execution Time vs. Number Of Bids (OPCOST, OPCOST-R and MTR) 
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Figure 13: Execution Time vs. Number of Bids (OPCOST and OPCOST-R) 
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Figure 14: Execution Time vs. Number Of Items 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
 
This research studied the opportunity cost algorithm and the effects of various graph 
topologies and node ordering on the winning solution. The shortcomings of the 
opportunity cost algorithm were identified. Improvements to the opportunity cost 
algorithm in the form of recalculations in OPCOST-R algorithm were suggested and 
implemented which significantly improved the solution quality. The OPCOST-R 
improved the solution quality with a marginal increase in the execution time, which is 
well justified. The MTR algorithm was also proposed and implemented that significantly 
improved the solution quality. The execution time for the MTR algorithm increases 
rapidly with the problem size and must be used on problems of acceptable size. For 
significantly large problems the OPCOST-R algorithm, which produces significant 
increase in solution quality with a marginal increase in execution time must be used. The 
OPCOST-R and MTR when used in place of the OPCOST algorithm to determine the 
winning bidders in a combinatorial auction for carrier selection in supply chains will 
result in more desirable allocation resulting in cost savings for the shippers. 
 Further research can be done to study the effect of double counting and improved 
ways to eliminate it from the OPCOST algorithm. The solution quality and the execution 
of the OPCOST, OPCOST-R and the MTR on more problem datasets can be obtained 
and studied. The trends in the solution quality and execution time can also be studied as a 
factor of the ratio of the number of bids and the number of items. 
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